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Abstract
Erving Goffman’s emphasis on impression management in everyday life means that for 
the most part persons offer only partial or incomplete glimpses of themselves. Indeed, 
under specifiable conditions self-presentations may take the form of a negational self. 
If negational selves exist at the person or individual level, then they must also exist at 
the collective level (that is, if we are to take seriously such notions as the social mind, 
collective representations, or even culture). Understandings of how this negational 
self appears and is produced at various analytical levels (micro, meso, and macro) can 
be anchored via a conceptual schema which merges Goffman’s own identity typology 
with the three-world model of Jürgen Habermas by way of Talcott Parsons.
Introduction
The negational self is a self by default, in that public social encounters rarely afford 
persons the opportunity to positively affirm their own selves (Chriss 1999a). Rather, for 
the most part persons are busily framing themselves from view, offering only limited 
glimpses of a “true” self through indirect and sometimes obfuscatory devices and 
strategies such as role distance, deference, modesty, accommodation, face and face-
saving, and body glosses to name a few.
The first part of the paper will summarize the symbolic interactionist perspective 
on the self. Although many observers suggest that Goffman falls squarely in the 
Meadian line regarding the social psychology of the self, through this brief survey 
it will be demonstrated that Goffman’s work is imbued with enough structuralist 
and functionalist elements to render such an easy alignment with standard social 
psychology problematic. Once the nature of Goffman’s position on self and identity 
is secure, I will then summarize the work of other authors who have developed 
approaches that to varying degrees are compatible with the concept of the negational 
self. In the last sections I will present an analytical schema, derived from Goffman but 
also from Parsons and Habermas, which explains how the negational self appears and 
is produced at various levels of the social system.
The Self in Sociological Social Psychology
In sociology and the social sciences today, the concept of the “self” is widely employed 
and accepted as a more or less stable feature of human reality (see Weigert and Gecas 2003). 
The modern understanding of something called a “self” begins with Rousseau, but 
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becomes more fully formed and less pathological in the tradition of German idealism, 
represented in the writings of Kant, Fichte, and Hegel (for summaries, see Ellwood 1938; Habermas 
1971, 1973; Henrich 2004; Seigel 2005; Solomon 1988). The self appears, albeit in muted form, 
as an aspect of the reflexivity posited by Dilthey, where the life unity is understood 
as a person’s reflecting back on his or her self in its historical setting (giving rise to both 
hermeneutics and certain forms of phenomenology, see, e.g., Carr 2003). By 1890 William James, along 
with other American pragmatists such as Charles Peirce, James Baldwin, and Josiah 
Royce had developed versions of the self, and these were influenced by German 
idealism even as these pragmatists were attempting to purge metaphysics from their 
systems. Modern symbolic interactionism, which holds the self as a central concept1 
as represented in the writings of George Herbert Mead and others, was influenced in 
its conceptual development by functional psychology, German idealism, the Scottish 
moralists, pragmatism, and even evolutionism (Edgley 2003; McCall 2006; Reynolds 2003).
For Mead and most contemporary social psychologists, the self arises as a result of 
reflexivity, that is, the human ability to reflect back on one’s own thoughts and actions 
in interaction with others. Reflexivity may appear in the form of the internal dialogue 
between the “I” and the “Me,” through more hermeneutical or phenomenological 
orientations, or even through overtly linguistic forms. Indeed, one of the most 
public and visible ways identity is constructed and negotiated is through talk 
(Cerulo 1997; Howard 2000).
Gecas and Burke (1995) argue that within social psychology there are four general 
orientations regarding the conceptualization of self and identity, namely situational, 
social structural, biographic-historical, and intrapersonal. The authors place Erving 
Goffman, for example, within the situational category insofar as this orientation 
emphasizes the emergence and maintenance of self within (most importantly) face-
to-face situations. By contrast the social structural approach to self and identity 
represented by Talcott Parsons focuses on the social structure of role relationships in 
group contexts (Callero 1994; Gecas and Burke 1995).
The situational approach has close affinities with the “social construction of reality” 
approach to social explanation (see, e.g., Berger and Luckmann 1966), emphasizing as it does 
the fluid, dynamic, and negotiable aspects of self and identity. According to this line 
of thinking, for example, from the structural side of self and identity, Parsons (1951) 
placed emphasis on the normative dimensions of role and role performance, whereas 
from the situational side Goffman (1959, 1974) emphasized the situational contingencies 
which shape or “frame” understandings of these role relations (Chriss 1995, 1999a; 2007; 
Reitzes and Mutran 2003).
1 As Baumeister (1998, p. 681) reports, the concepts “self” and “attitude” appear most frequently in psychology journals, and it 
is very likely that the self is among the most discussed concepts appearing in sociology journals as well (see also Owens 2003).
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Setting the Stage: Goffman and the Self
Although the majority of commentators share Gecas and Burke’s view that Goffman 
falls squarely within the situational or symbolic interactionist camp (see, e.g., Levine 1995), 
others suggest that Goffman is as much a structuralist, or functionalist, or perhaps some 
of both (e.g., Brown 1977; Chriss 2003; Gonos 1977; Gouldner 1970). Because they place emphasis 
on the mind, interactionists tend to view social situations not from some objective 
or external standpoint, but from the perspective of the subjective states of actors 
engaged in face-to-face interaction. As Gonos (1977, p. 863) suggests, for interactionists 
“the starting point for social analysis is the meaning that actors give to their situation.”
Although Goffman (1974) suggests in Frame Analysis that the perspective he employs is 
situational, by which he means a concern with the sorts of things individuals are alive 
to at any particular moment, his notion of “frame” serves effectively to diminish the 
importance of the work of defining situations in the here and now. In other words, the 
interaction order is propped up or sustained by a presumably more primordial set of 
social conventions (framing rules) by which interactants are able in the first place to 
understand and haggle over the range of possibilities for making sense of any scene 
toward the ultimate goal of defining a situation. Similar to Durkheim’s dictum that 
human society is a reality sui generis, Goffman viewed human face-to-face interaction 
as the interaction order sui generis (MacCannell 1990; Rawls 1987).
The idea here is that there are important elements of social life that predate any 
particular strip of activity within which persons find themselves in the immediate 
presence of others. As Goffman (1974, pp. 1-2) stated:
Defining situations as real certainly has consequences, but these may contribute very 
marginally to the events in progress; in some cases only a slight embarrassment flits 
across the scene in mild concern for those who tried to define the situation wrongly. …
Presumably, a “definition of the situation” is almost always to be found, but those who 
are in the situation ordinarily do not create this definition, even though their society 
often can be said to do so; ordinarily, all they do is to assess correctly what the situation 
ought to be for them and then act accordingly.
Goffman is warning that we must go beyond the definition of the situation because 
all social systems can be shown to possess particular understandings of what it means 
to be of a certain age, sex, class status, location or territory, that is, distinct cultural 
configurations designating proper ways of conducting oneself. As Goffman (1959, p. 75) 
explains, “To be a given kind of person, then, is not merely to possess the required 
attributes, but also to sustain the standards of conduct and appearance that one’s 
social grouping attaches thereto.”
This resembles Talcott Parsons’ notion that culture fulfills the pattern-maintenance 
function for the broader social system. This is because the role concept, which both 
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Parsons and Goffman employed frequently (Chriss 1999a), can be used at both levels 
of the social system simultaneously (Bradbury, Heading, and Hollis 1972; Popitz 1972). That is, 
at the micro or situational level one may emphasize the way the self emerges and is 
maintained in situations, while at the macro or structural level one may emphasize 
the consequences of role relationships as these are attached to particular statuses or 
positions in society. The role concept can be used at either end of the micro-macro 
analytical spectrum, or anywhere in between for that matter. Indeed, theorists as 
seemingly diverse as Parsons and Goffman have found role theory useful for their own 
purposes, and this owes primarily to the fact that the role concept has at least four 
distinct historical sources (Chriss 1999a; Joas 1985; Levine 1995; R. Turner 1985, 2001): (1) the work 
of Park (1926, 1927) and Mead (1934) giving rise to the symbolic interactionist tradition; 
(2) Lewin’s (1951) gestalt theory; (3) Moreno’s (1934) therapeutic program known as 
sociodrama; and (4) Linton’s (1936) anthropological theory of culture.
It is also worth noting that these four historical sources of role theory align remarkably 
well with the four general orientations to the conceptualization of self and identity 
suggested by Gecas and Burke (1995) above. Table 1 illustrates this alignment.
Role Theories Self and Identity
Symbolic Interactionism Situational
Gestalt Theory Intrapersonal
Sociodrama Biographical-Historical
Linton’s concept of culture Social Structural
Table 1. Four Role Theories and Their Alignment with Orientations toward Self and Identity
Where might Goffman’s work fit within this nexus of orientations toward role, self, 
and identity? Although observers such as Verhoeven (1985) suggest it is fruitless to 
pigeonhole Goffman as belonging to a particular theoretical perspective, it appears 
that Goffman is most strongly linked with the social structural and situational 
orientations (see Callero 1994, p. 229, for a discussion of the convergence of these two perspectives on 
the primacy of structural positions in the development of roles). For example, Goffman was not all 
that concerned with the subjectivity of actors as they negotiate definitions of the 
situation in face-to-face settings. Although social performances are shot through with 
actors’ assumptions of the perceived moral universe, insofar as they are concerned 
with cutting types of figures perceived to embody notions of the “well-demeaned 
individual” before particular audiences, oftentimes this morality to which Goffman 
refers appears to be in the first instance institutionally defined (Rawls 1987, p. 143).
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The Importance of the Negational Self
Although Goffman never employed the term “negational self” to refer to the self 
in interaction, his work nevertheless strongly hints at its importance. Perhaps the 
most consistent focus on something that could be called a negational self is found 
in Goffman’s Frame Analysis. When discussing the human being, Goffman notes 
that most persons in their everyday lives readily draw inferences about what 
persons are presumably really like from their “anchored doings,” that is, from their 
mundane activities which can be witnessed by any co-present others. A person’s 
actions, utterances, mannerisms, gestures, and appearance as he or she is doing 
something — that is, playing a role — before a group of others in a social setting are said 
to contribute to an ongoing record of that person’s identity. Goffman warns, however, 
that lay notions concerning the wholeness and authenticity of actors’ performances in 
roles can take us only so far. As Goffman (1974, p. 294) states, “Behind current role, the 
person himself will peek out. Indeed, this is a common way of framing our perception 
of another. So three cheers for the self. Now let us try to reduce the clatter.”
Within any strip of activity a person may “peek out,” which suggests that even though 
lay observers may feel comfortable assigning some stable sense of self to the person, 
social scientists like Goffman are much more squeamish about it. There is really not 
much there, or rather, there is not much warrant to make such strong inferences 
about selfhood knowing, as Goffman does, how adept persons are at staging whatever 
version of self is called for within face-to-face interaction. Although much information 
can be gleaned from persons within face-to-face interaction, there is no way of 
knowing, really, whether what is witnessed in terms of self- or team-presentations 
can be connected to underlying truths about the selves being observed. Goffman 
(1974, p. 508) goes so far as to suggest that, rather than providing information to others 
in interaction, what we are really doing is putting on shows.
By putting on shows in this way, through our presentation of self on the front stage, 
we are playing a character that meets the situational needs of the social gathering. 
The assumption of what sort of figure ought to be struck before a group of others is 
the assumption of the lead character, of the person who has the floor at any particular 
moment. Everyone is playing parts on a stage, but it is a free secret, in that no one is 
willing to admit it, yet everyone knows what the game is. Everyone’s play acting, then, 
is tolerated and even expected, and we provide latitude for these little scenes because 
to not do so would show us to be faulty interactants who thereby cannot be accorded 
full status as fellow participants in the setting because we can’t even get this little 
thing right. The ultimate endpoint of all of this is that for the most part actors busily 
frame their “true” selves from view, as they go about putting on one-person shows for 
the benefit of the audience (Goffman 1974, p. 547).
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Other Literature Concerning the Negational Self
As we have seen, Goffman notes that both the lay public and certain traditions within 
social psychology have given the self too much credit, that is, by assuming that the 
performances actors put on point toward wholeness and authenticity regarding the 
claims of selfhood or identity being made. One such tradition within the scholarly 
literature is Manford Kuhn’s so-called Twenty Statements Test. Kuhn and McPartland 
(1954) instructed undergraduate student test subjects to ask themselves “Who Am I?” 
and to jot down their responses on a sheet of paper. The responses generally fell into 
two broad categories. One of the categories consisted of “consensual” self-attitudes, 
for example, identifying oneself as mother, student, worker, or athlete. These are 
consensual self-attitudes because they refer to broadly agreed upon categories 
of persons, or “statuses” as that term is used by sociologists. A second category of 
responses were labeled “subconsensual,” and these are more abstract characterizations 
of self, such as the respondent describing him- or herself as “happy,” “easy to get along 
with,” or “pretty good” at doing something (playing baseball, carpentry work, fishing, 
and so forth). Generally people list the consensual categories first, then start listing a 
range of subconsensual categories that purport to characterize the self in some way.
Psychologist William McGuire (1984) has criticized Kuhn and others who ask 
respondents to react to the question “Who am I?” in this manner. This approach is 
limited because it yields only an affirmative self-concept, namely, what people think 
they are or what they believe they are good at. McGuire (1984, p. 99) argues that what 
has been overlooked in these studies is the “negation self-concept,” which can be 
derived simply by asking respondents “Tell us what you are not.” This approach led 
McGuire to develop distinctiveness theory, which argues that persons’ perceptions of 
how they differ from others in certain situations are at least as important as their own 
affirmative self-perceptions. In other words, given certain conditions persons will find 
their perceived differences from others to be most salient, and hence the negation 
self-concept is sometimes a more robust predictor of attitudes or actions than the 
affirmative self-concept. For example, in schools with a majority white population, 
white students were not very likely to mention affirmatively their race on the “Tell us 
about yourself” prompt. However, when asked to respond to “Tell us what you are 
not,” race became highly salient for these white students. In other words, in this social 
situation white students were more likely to report not having a minority ethnicity (in 
response to “tell us what you are not”) than they were to report having a majority 
ethnicity (in response to “tell us about yourself”; see McGuire and McGuire (1987, pp. 
140-141).
This version of the negational self, informed by McGuire’s work in psychology, finds 
a parallel in sociologist George McCall’s (2003) notion of the “Not-Me.” Similar to 
McGuire, McCall argues that there are both positive and negative poles of identity. 
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Following from both Goffman and Gregory Stone (1962), McCall (2003, p. 12) points out 
that “identifying with one social object often entails disidentifying with other social 
objects that differ from that one.” This suggests that normal processes of both self-
identification and self-disidentification are at work in social interaction. McCall came up 
with a “What Am I NOT?” test to explore aspects of self-disidentification. This resulted 
in respondents producing a series of “I am not...” statements, which taken together 
constitute the Not-Me. What McCall discovered is that persons may engage either 
in proactive identity work—for example, assertions of self in situations through self-
presentation or support seeking—or reactive identity work, which occurs primarily in 
situations where others impute to a person an identity that that person had excluded 
from his or her self-concept. This means that, more often than not, the Not-Me will 
come into view as a result of reactive identity work (McCall 2003, p. 20).
Although the work of McGuire and McCall leads us toward the negational self, by 
combining Goffman’s own identity typology with other systems of thought that are 
often thought to be antithetical to Goffman—such as the grand theories of Talcott 
Parsons and Jürgen Habermas—we are in a position to understand more precisely both 
the social structural and social psychological conditions that give rise to the negational 
self. In the next section we will briefly examine Goffman’s tripartite identity typology.
Goffman’s Identity Typology
Goffman (1963) argues there are three distinct types of identities, namely personal 
identity, social identity, and ego (or felt) identity. By personal identity, Goffman is 
referring to the special or peculiar characteristics an individual possesses which make 
him or her truly unique.2 This is the idea that nobody can walk in another person’s 
shoes, meaning that no two persons share the exact same socialization experiences, 
or hang out with the exact same group of persons, or hold the same ideas about the 
world and the people around them. In everyday life we learn to peg individuals as 
being a certain type of person, and further characterizations about persons are made 
with regard to their biographies, their work, their interpersonal demeanor, and so 
forth. The sum total of all this information leads persons to impute a relatively stable 
personal identity to themselves and to others to the extent that persons embody the 
convergence of all these social, cultural, personal, and biographical elements, uniquely 
configured in every case.
Although personal identity, on the one hand, and ego or felt identity (to be discussed 
below), on the other, are often conflated or equated in the literature, the main 
distinction between the two is that at its core personal identity is composed of the 
2 Compare Thomas Luckmann’s (1979, p. 60) take on personal identity: “This form of life, i.e. the human level of behavioral 
integration, is most aptly described by the concept of personal identity. Personal identity refers to central long-range control 
of its behavior by an individual organism.” This notion of the controlling aspect of identity is compatible with Parsons’ (1968) 
conceptualization of identity.
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particular value structures of reference groups and other social actors with whom 
the person interacts (Hitlin 2003). Ego identity possesses no such particularistic value 
structure at its core (as we shall see). And further, this objectification of self is often 
felt by the person as somehow an inauthentic representation of who that person 
“really is,” which thereby prompts the person to develop a self in opposition to the 
stigmatized or objectified self represented in the value system of fellow interactants. 
This is clearly one aspect of the negational self.
On the other hand, when the value judgments made by others are in alignment with, 
and are accepted more or less nonproblematically as a true or authentic representation 
of one’s self, then we may speak of social identity. This second understanding of identity 
that Goffman develops refers to the supraindividual level of societal reality, namely, 
the notion that persons have available to them general or broad cultural criteria by 
which they categorize themselves and other persons as this or that type of person.
The third type of identity Goffman distinguishes is ego (or felt) identity. Although 
somewhat close to personal identity, ego identity is not necessarily avowed by the 
person or ascribed by a collectivity (as in the case of social identity), but is felt by 
persons as one of the more intimate subjective moments answering to the question 
“Who am I?” With ego identity, a person takes liberties to fashion whatever identity is 
seen by him or her as most relevant or suitable in a given situation. As Robin Williams 
(2000, p. 7) explains, the central characteristic of ego identity is
…the capacity of individuals to choose amongst a set of available attributes, and a concern 
with the coherence and consistency discernible within the variety of chacterisations 
accepted by individuals to be true of themselves independent of time and location.
Although Goffman was a sociological social psychologist, he was also a structuralist and 
microfunctionalist (Chriss 2003). Embedded within his understanding of self and identity 
were structural elements which he tended to underplay. Ironically, it is the negational 
self aspects of Goffman’s structural social psychology that are retrievable with the 
help of macro theorists such as Parsons and Habermas. This will be developed in the 
next few sections.
Bringing in Parsons and Habermas
Whereas Goffman focused his research and theorizing at the micro-level of face-to-face 
interaction, Talcott Parsons worked at much higher levels of theoretical abstraction 
and generality. Yet, as he was attempting to keep the social system in view in its 
totality, Parsons believed that he could explain anything within the system, including 
such “micro” phenomena as identity, the self, and social interaction. For example, 
Parsons (1968) fashioned a conceptualization of identity out of the far-reaching changes 
and structural strains evident in the social systems of the West. Specifically, Parsons 
saw the proliferation of such terms as “identity” and “alienation” in usage within both 
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intellectual and lay communities as symptomatic of broader structural changes in 
society. Parsons (1968, p. 11) explains that this change in the cultural definition of the 
situation
…is in part a consequence of the increasingly elaborate structural differentiation of the 
society, which produces increasing pluralization of the role-involvements of the typical 
individual. This means both an often bewildering range of possible choices and complex 
cross-pressures once commitments have been made.
Authors have written about such things as the “crisis of identity” (Bendle 2002) and the 
profusion of individual roles and identities in the postwar period (Frank and Meyer 2002; 
Orrange 2003). Castells (1997) links the growth in concerns with identity in the postmodern 
era to the rise of the Information Age. The Information Age corresponds with the 
increasing globalization brought about by continuing refinements and advancements 
in communication technologies (such as the Internet) that have produced a globalized 
“network society” characterized by the demise of statism. Within this confluence 
of historical change and flux of local and global social environments many of us are 
examining and re-examining our identities, whether at the private or collective levels 
(Howarth 2002, p. 145). A number of authors have argued that there are many forces pulling 
selves in different directions; in effect, there are too many messages about who we 
are or what we should be (see, e.g., Gergen 1991; Holstein and Gubrium 2000).
Whereas in the past persons received their identities or senses of self from their deep 
and abiding embeddedness in primary groups—particularly the family (see Kellerhals et al. 
2002) — the modern or postmodern decentered subject is now free to explore an ever-
expanding range of possibilities with regard to self (Harré 1991; Orrange 2003). For example, 
the waning of the traditional extended, patriarchal family system and the rise of the 
smaller, nuclear family means that women now garner more education than ever 
before, and are better able to challenge paternal authority (Chriss 1999b; Gouldner 1979). 
The patriarchal identification of woman with “mother” or “housewife” is rendered 
illegitimate with the rise of universal notions of personhood and the empowerment 
of the sovereign individual to decide these things for him- or herself (Frank and Meyer 2002, 
p. 92).
With the number of role-identities or selves seemingly proliferating, modern persons 
may now be characterized as engaging in “identity shopping” (Halter 2000; Markowitz 1997; 
compare Giddens 1991; James 1890). Those who take structure and structural constraints 
seriously, such as for example Goffman and Parsons, are correct in noting that there 
are limits to how far persons or groups can go in legitimately claiming identities for 
themselves or for the collectivities to which they belong. This is why it is important 
to understand how the identity typology of Goffman aligns with the three analytical 
worlds—subjective, objective, and social—as formulated by both Parsons (1951) and 
Habermas (1984, 1987), and which correspond as well to the three types of identity 
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which Goffman developed. In the remaining sections I will explain how the elements 
of Goffman’s identity typology and, by extension, the negational self, fit into the three-
world schema.
Recapitulation
Our discussion to this point implies three broad types of identity processes. The 
first describes the situation in which persons are apt to acquiesce to—perhaps even 
accept or embrace—a particular social identity in a more or less nonproblematic way. 
Here, organizational or broader cultural scripts are invoked around which a general 
consensus is forged among participants about the nature of selves in interaction. Here, 
“normal appearances” are more or less managed and maintained (Goffman 1971). This 
aligns analytically with Goffman’s social identity because of the way social consensus 
forges identity in these instances.
A second situation is one in which a person resists, either openly or more furtively 
or surreptitiously, a particular identity that is being called for or demanded of him or 
her in particular circumstances. This applies to the case of the broken narratives of 
inmate, colonial, or stigmatized populations more generally. Here, a search is launched 
for the authentic self in opposition to the alienated or stigmatized virtual self that is 
being foisted upon persons or groups in terms of collective identity (Appiah 1994). The 
negational self implies a rejected or stigmatized identity. Likewise stigmatized identity 
aligns with Goffman’s notion of personal identity for reasons that will be elucidated 
briefly below.
A third situation typifies the condition of postmodern decentered subjects who have 
a variety of options from which to pick and choose in forging identities and senses of 
self. Indeed, in the postmodern condition persons have the opportunity to engage in 
“reselfing,” namely the transformation and recreation of the self (Wexler 1998; see Martin 
2002 for an analysis of reselfing by persons within Overeaters Anonymous and other such organizations). In 
these instances, Goffman ego identity can be found to be consistent on some levels 
with the notion of “identity shopping” (Halter 2000; Markowitz 1997).
The egalitarian environment of postmodern culture allows for the opening up of 
possibilities with regard to identity and self-presentation, as many of the traditional 
ways of understanding what is expected of self and others has fallen into disrepair. For 
all intents and purposes this began with the transition from feudalism to capitalism, 
specifically with regard to the decline of serf labor and the hollowing out of noblesse 
oblige as a moral mandate for behavior based upon status. Although the modern 
condition by no means allows for complete openness with regard to the range of 
possibilities regarding personal or group expression of identity — there are, after all, 
still fairly rigid expectations for behavior based on gender, social class, occupation, 
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race and ethnicity, kinship, and so forth — it is certainly more flexible and open to 
negotiation than ever before in recorded human history. The negational self specifically 
finds no purchase here.
On the other hand, the negational self gains strength in the form of identity shopping 
as described above. Although more dynamic and negotiable today than ever before, 
identity shopping is nevertheless constrained by a prevailing cultural heritage 
proscribing and prescribing possibilities for the presentation of self. In other words, 
although identity shopping has become more prominent within postmodern society, 
it does not exhaust understandings of self and identity as made clear by the other 
types of identity discussed here. In order to understand the linkages between these 
various forms of identity, we must take note briefly of how the ideas of Goffman and 
Parsons converge on the conceptualization of self and identity.
Parsons, Goffman, and Three Analytical Worlds
Utilizing Parsons’ AGIL schema, I shall now attempt to systematize the identity typology 
that so far has been presented. I follow Parsons (1951, 1996) and Habermas (1984, 1987) 
in conceiving of three analytical worlds with regard to social scientific explanation of 
human social life. Parsons (1996, p. 23) held that “…there is no reason to make any radical 
distinction in kind between habits of thought and technological habits. We are one 
organism, not two, and viewed from one angle we are physical, from another mental, 
from another moral.” This distinction corresponds with a classification of analytical 
worlds made famous by Habermas (1984, 1987), insofar as one may speak, respectively, of 
an objective world (where the validity claim of propositional truth holds), a subjective 
world (associated with the validity claim of subjective truthfulness), and a social world 
(where issues of normative rightness apply) (Chriss 1995, 1996).3
Here, Habermas, drawing on Parsons, explicitly is attempting to escape the standard 
subject-object dyad or dichotomy by moving toward the triadic structure of subject-
object-social. Parsons, drawing from Mead and the symbolic interactionists, 
had earlier developed the notion of double contingency, namely, the idea that 
in interaction persons must take into account the perspective of others as well as 
their own perceptions of these others (and themselves) in order for interaction to 
proceed smoothly. In other words, in most routine face-to-face settings persons are 
both subject and object to each other simultaneously (Parsons 1977). Habermas’s triadic 
structure, which Strydom (2001) identifies as “triple contingency,” moves beyond the 
3 It is important to note that even though Habermas was influenced by an incipient notion of a three-world model evident in the 
writings of the young Parsons, Parsons was by no means the first person to conceptualize this. Before Parsons was even born 
Franklin Giddings (1899, p. 10) wrote that “Every human being is at once an animal, a conscious individual mind, and a socius. As 
an animal he is studied by the anatomist and physiologist; as a conscious mind he is studied by the psychologist; as a socius, loving 
and seeking acquaintance, forming friendships and alliances with other socii like himself, imitating them and setting examples 
for them, teaching them and learning from them, and engaging with them in many forms of common activity,—he is studied by 
the sociologist.” Among sociologists, Giddings should receive proper credit for being the innovator of this three-world concept.
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dyad of subject-object or speaker-hearer to the triad of speaker-hearer-observer. As 
Strydom (2001, p. 174) explains,
…in addition to the perspectives of speaker and hearer, another perspective comes 
into play in the development beyond the double contingency relation. This is the 
perspective of the observer. …The first person who is speaking and the second person 
who is addressed and responds shows up against the background of the uninvolved 
third person.
In other words, the formulation by Habermas attempts to take into account not only 
the situation of Ego and Alter as they interact in face-to-face settings, but also the 
social environment within which such interactions occur. In this sense, Habermas’s 
notion of triple contingency at the macro level is consistent with Norbert Wiley’s (1994) 
notion of the triadic structure of the self residing at the micro level, namely the self 
understood as I-You-Me (going beyond Mead’s dyadic subject of I-Me).
FUNCTIONAL ELEMENTS OF                                             PRIMARY IDENTITY           GOFFMAN’S         NEGATIONAL 
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                                                    SOCIAL                                                     SOCIAL                WEAK 
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                                                                        INDIVIDUALIZATION 
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                                                                                                                 (identity shopping) 
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                                              OBJECTIVE          OBJECTIFICATION     PERSONAL       STRONGEST 
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Figure 1. Analytical Worlds and Identity
As depicted in Figure 1, the three analytical worlds — objective, social, and 
subjective — lay in the interstices between the four functions of the action system, 
as developed by Parsons and Platt (1973). Consistent with the AGIL schema, at the 
level of the action system the behavioral organism fulfills the adaptation function, the 
personality the goal-attainment function, the social system the integrative function, 
4 The functional elements of the action system — culture, social system, personality, and behavioral organism — are related 
cybernetically according to the dictum “things high in information control things high in energy.” Culture sits atop the cybernetic 
hierarchy insofar as it is highest in information, while the behavioral organism sits at the lower end analytically since it is lowest 
in information while highest in energy.
5 The primary identity process aligning with the social world is group or social consensus forged around predominately 
ascriptive criteria (age, gender, race, social class). For the subjective world, the primary process is individualization, as persons 
in postconventional society are freed somewhat from the dictates of status where criteria of achievement override ascription 
in many areas of life (but not all). The negational self gains a foothold here, and shows up explicitly for example in the form of 
identity shopping. For the objective world, the primary process is objectification as in Hegel’s notion of the master-bondsman 
dialectic, and it is here that the negational self fully flowers.
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and culture the latent pattern maintenance function. As seen in Figure 1, the functional 
elements of the action system are arranged according to the cybernetic hierarchy 
of control, whereby things high in information “control” things high in energy. This 
means that the cybernetic hierarchy of functional elements is always in the direction 
of L-I-G-A. Hence, culture, which is high in information, sits at the pinnacle of the 
cybernetic hierarchy as it is high in information relative to the next subsystem down, 
namely the social system. The social system is in turn higher in information than the 
personality system, while in turn the personality system is higher in information than 
the behavioral system (or organism). Finally, in turn, the behavioral system is lowest 
in information but highest in energy. With regard to interpreting the three analytical 
worlds and their interrelation, we may say that the social world is the highest in 
information among the three worlds, bounded above by the cultural subsystem and 
below by the social system, then similarly for the subjective and objective worlds 
which are bounded above and below as depicted in Figure 1.
Goffman’s three identities — social, ego, and personal — can be located within 
appropriate analytical worlds as depicted in the figure. Goffman’s personal identity 
(or stigmatized identity) aligns with the objective world insofar as this particular form 
of identity arises most prominently through a process of objectification whereby 
persons develop identities by first becoming objects of others’ scorn and/or scrutiny. 
The negational self thrives here. Goffman’s notion of ego identity aligns with identity 
shopping (both of which are connected to the subjective analytical world) insofar as 
here individuals are choosing from among a set of available attributes — shopping 
for identity in other words — concerning who they are independent of time, location, 
and other cultural and social factors (Williams 2000). Indeed, the notions of identity 
shopping and narrative identity6 agree as well with Habermas’ (1987, p. 106) discussion 
of, respectively, the distinction Mead makes (1934) between the “I” (ego identity) and 
the “Me” (role identity):
At the level of role-identity a person understands himself in such a way that he 
answers the question, what kind of person he is (has become), what character he has 
(has acquired) by means of ascribed predicates. At the level of ego-identity a person 
understands himself in a different way, namely, by answering the question, who or what 
kind of person he wants to be.
6 For narrative identity I draw primarily from Ezzy (1998), who combines the hermeneutics of Paul Ricouer’s identity theory with 
Mead’s conception of the temporal and intersubjective nature of the self. Ezzy agrees with Ricouer (1992) in placing somewhat 
more emphasis than Mead (1934) does on temporality to the extent that, although the self arises through a reflective process 
as persons take into account their own and others’ attitudes toward them, this process takes place over time, over the course 
of which persons engage in the narrative construction of identity (but cf. Daly 2002; Flaherty 2002, 2003). As Ezzy (1998, p. 245) 
states, “Narratives are integrally temporal because they configure the events of the past, present, and future into a narrative 
whole.” From this perspective, selves are constructed through storytelling (see, e.g., Broad 2002; Holstein and Gubrium 2000; 
Loseke 2007; Mason 2004; Randall 1995; Wiley 1994).
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Following the logic of the cybernetic hierarchy of control, even within post-conventional 
society the fairly “conventional” process of narrative identity still holds sway (insofar 
as it is highest in “information” in relation to the other two types of identity), as 
social consensus remains a powerful force in regulating interpersonal relations and 
notions of self and identity. There is a limit to understanding and explaining identity 
in individualistic or subjectivist terms, as explained by Mason (2004, p. 177): “People’s 
identities and practices are embedded in sets of relationships that do not fit neatly 
into and cannot be envisioned through these [subjectivist or individualist] frames.” 
Even so, we would expect that identity shopping will continue to gain momentum as 
an important process in identity formation for the foreseeable future, especially as 
equity concerns continue to fuel and in turn inform legal, cultural, and social spheres 
(Elliott 2007; for the classical statement on equity, see Maine 1963 [1861]).
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